ABSTRACT. International relations, as every other scientific discipline, tries to be autonomous; however, that depends on its relationship with time and space. The current situation characterized by post-cold war and globalization realities constitutes an opportunity for the heuristic reinvention of international relations (IR). The reformulation of IR is neither a rejection of the old, nor a worship of the new; it is a reflection of the dynamics affecting international relations through both process and relational analyses.
Introduction
It is now a common discourse to argue about the new era as a challenge for international relations (IR) (Czempiel and Rosenau, 1989; Youngs, 1999; Clark, 1999) . IR is generally depicted through two main factors.
The first factor is trivialized through an image: the fall of the Berlin Wall (Wohlforth, 1998) . Even if the use of ordinary images can be an epistemological obstacle because it impoverishes the analysis and creates confusion between scientific knowledge and everyday discourse, one must agree that what is at stake is fundamental. The "Berlin Wall" argument is the emblematic or the metaphorical representation of realism's dominance in international relations as a discipline. It was an element of the material culture structured by realism; it was also the symbol of the preponderance of specific analytical categories such as sovereignty, power politics, a world of states, national interest, and so on. As a materiality, what made the Berlin Wall historically possible was the realist functioning of international relations. That is why the cold war was considered as the factual legitimization of the realist paradigm; such a circular relation between theory and reality has to do with positivism (Holsti, 1998) . What may be termed the positivistic arrogance of realism is due to its being the tradition of thought through which international relations became a discipline (Giesen, 1992) .
Despite its attempt to become a "timeless wisdom" (Buzan, 1996: 47-65) , realism is linked to a context and a history: "The realist tradition in international relations, its principles and its orientations can fully be understood only when contextualized within the times in which it was formed: those of the failure of the interwar hopes for international peace through the League of Nations and the outbreak and conduct of world war two" (Youngs, 1999: 71-72 ; see also Sindjoun, 1999) . The cold war was part of the times in which realism was consolidated, but this does not mean that realism has not evolved through time and context (Waltz, 1979; Waever, 1996: 149-185) .
The Berlin Wall was the symbol of realism's preponderance, and its fall is sometimes used to disqualify proponents of realism (Sorensen, 1998; Wohlforth, 1998) . The argument here is in fact deterministic: when the historical conditions of the current paradigm change, so must the paradigm. In that perspective, the new era is problematized in terms of "post-realism" or "post-positivism" (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, 1996) ; beyond the image of "the fall of the Berlin Wall," what is at stake at the epistemological level is the crisis of the realist monopoly in international relations, where it is presented as deprived of its material or factual legitimacy (see the contribution of Bertrand Badie in this issue).
The second factor used to describe the new era is the process of globalization (Clark, 1999) . Historically, it is through the prism of the nation or the perspective of the state that international relations was seen as a discipline. The national prism refers to the unit of analysis through which the construction and the deconstruction of the distinction "inside/outside" had made sense (Ashley, 1987; Sindjoun, 1999: 154; Badie, 1995) . The constructionists and the deconstructionists are not necessarily opposed about the pertinence of the national prism: for the former, the distinction is fundamental and constitutes the source of international relations (Clark, 1999: 14-26) ; even the deconstruction of the great divide is not necessarily a refutation of the national paradigm, but generally an illustration of the fluidity of demarcation, of interaction and linkage between inside and outside (Keohane and Nye, 1989) . But in both approaches the "national" was the unit of reference: the national being understood in the perspective of distinction or in the perspective of an inside/outside continuum or fluidity.
What is currently part of the new era is the change of scale, the change of the unit of analysis. The evolution is toward the "crisis" of the national monopoly (Appadurai, 1993: 269-295; , in which the "global" perspective is becoming important. It is an opportunity to rediscover conceptual categories such as humanity and cosmopolitanism (see the contribution of Andrew Linklater in this issue; see also Albert, Brock, and Wolf, 2000) . Understood as a "process of time and space compression," globalization constitutes a challenge for the great divide (Clark, 1998) ; it had transformed the context, the forms, and the actors of international relations. The technological, economic, political, and cultural reconfiguration of international relations is so important that the label is sometimes contested: James Rosenau has suggested the replacement of "international relations" by "post-international politics" (Rosenau, 1989: 1-20) ; Gillian Youngs (1999: 1-11) observes an evolution "from international relations to global relations."
International relations as a discipline is linked to the inter-state world, to the (Halliday, 1994) . The present times are those of transformation, sometimes presented in terms of "crises." I am reluctant to use that notion because of its pathological connotation; I prefer the notion of "transformation," "change," which does justice to the dynamics of international relations as a discipline. As a matter of fact, we are in a heuristic period; change reminds us that science is not ahistorical.
All science is linked to its epoch. Having said that, I keep in mind the capacity of the researcher to transcend his epoch, to resist the pressures of a specific moment. In this regard, one could envisage the following hypothesis in order to understand the pathological explanation of the transformation in international relations: the logic of abstraction common to the scientific enterprise may have brought international relations specialists far from the reality and closer to worship of the paradigm, with the success of realism no longer perceived as contingent. So, to some extent, the current situation can be analyzed as the "irruption of real history" into the paradigms. The end of the cold war and the process of globalization bound international relations specialists to the reinvention and reformulation of their discipline. Meanwhile, (contrary to Tandeka Nkiwane's contribution to this issue), I do not advocate an absolute contextual determinism of paradigms. The paradigms-when they are instrumentalized and not worshiped-can be extracted from the historical and social circumstances of their elaboration: it is not time for the requiem of realism (although Bertrand Badie, in this issue, does not agree with me); realism will remain valid and pertinent in order to analyze some trends of reality (such as power politics and conflicts) (Guzzini, 1998; Sindjoun and Vennesson, 2000) .
My main aim in the introduction to this special issue on "The Transformation of International Relations" is to illustrate the importance of an approach to international relations that combines process and relation; such an approach helps to understand the dynamics of the discipline. Thus transformation becomes an illustration of a living discipline. The idea of transformation sheds more light on the complexity of reformulating international relations, neither as an absolute break with the past, nor as an absolute continuity. I think that in order to understand the dynamics of the discipline, the required epistemological attitude is the one that considers change as normal, which transcends the twin illusions of "it is always as usual," or "it is completely new."
International Relations, a Changing Discipline
At the outset, it should be remembered that paradigms, as explained by Thomas Kuhn (1983) , are important for the scientific consecration of knowledge. The paradigm, when it is consolidated, can resist the erosion of time thanks not only to its pertinence but also to its socialization, to its social legitimacy; that is partly why inter-paradigmatic debate was not always articulated around the observation and explanation of reality (see the contribution of Bertrand Badie in this issue; see also Waever, 1996: 149-185 the process of becoming a "normal science," a science structured by paradigms (Kuhn, 1983) , had become conservative. The scientific career of a paradigm is not always a matter of factual pertinence and explanatory power. Despite its paradigmatic conservatism, international relations is bound to change, as it did in 1945 (Kahler, 1997: 20-53) . The challenge of globalization is very important; it is interesting to note that the phenomenon and the discipline bear a common designation; if the phenomenon has a new context, why not the discipline? Obviously, international relations is a changing discipline: the changes are not only set in motion by the challenges of materiality, by observed phenomena; some changes are due to gender critiques (Elsthain, 1995: 340-360; Sylvester, 1996: 254-278) , to the rediscovery of political philosophy, and so on. I will focus more in this introduction on changes with material or phenomenal causes. Those changes, when analyzed in relation to the articles in this issue, lead to the reconceptualization of international relations. More precisely, founding concepts of international relations must not be considered pure essences; they are dynamic. Change does not necessarily create a radical new situation: as demonstrated by Tandeka Nkiwane in this issue, traditional meanings of states and sovereignty still make sense to some African actors.
The concept of sovereignty is a pillar of international relations. According to realist orthodoxy, sovereignty is the organizing principle of international life. As defined by Stephen Krasner in this issue, "Sovereignty refers to both practices, such as the ability to control transborder movements or activities within a state's boundaries, and to rules and principles, such as the recognition of juridically independent territorial entities and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states." Rules and practices associated with sovereignty are more and more contested in the context of globalization:
• Norms related to human rights promote interference in internal affairs; this implies a cosmopolitan trend which puts emphasis more on the identification between individuals and humanity than between individuals and the state (see the contribution of Andrew Linklater in this issue; see also Sindjoun, 1996) . • Human transborder flows are so important that they affect the state's capacity to control its territory; capital flows and the communication revolution contribute to empty sovereignty of its territorial content. • Transnational individual and collective actors are obtaining more opportunities openly to challenge states. • Environmental exigencies reinforce a transborder vision; in this regard, the establishment of international environment institutions and the activities of NGOs by "greening" sovereignty are modifying its character and its meaning (Litfin, 1998) .
It is important (as Stephen Krasner notes in this issue) that sovereignty has always been challenged, that "globalization and intrusive international norms are an old not a new phenomenon." However, the argument of the permanence of challenges to sovereignty cannot refute the observation of the new challenges dramatized by the development of globalization. Globalization is a moving configuration. This does not negate the necessity to "historicize" globalization in order to avoid the illusion that "it is completely new"; but "everything is not as usual." This is the case with sovereignty. What occurs beyond the persistence of sovereignty (the instrumentalization of sovereignty by actors, the specific and 222
International Political Science Review 22 (3) conflictual meaning and uses of sovereignty) seems to be more important than the observation of its common occurrence. The concept and the realities that it is supposed to signify are changing. To some extent, the concept itself is meaningless. What is meaningful is that the concept is associated with practices, representations, actions, and so on. The Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty is progressively losing its monopoly. Some authors have even envisaged a post-sovereignty world, or a world without sovereignty (Camilleri and Falk, 1992; Badie, 1999) . The desacralization of sovereignty is important for the discipline of international relations. Being a "social construction" (Biersteker and Weber, 1996) , a mobilizing fiction created for political purposes, sovereignty is in fact a practical category; it is an ideology for the legitimation of the state inside and outside its territory (Sfez, 2000) . The epistemological problem here is that international relations specialists have sometimes uncritically used a conceptual instrument created by the states for the legitimization of their actions (Krasner, 1997) , without paying more attention to the reality; the reality (as Krasner points out in this issue) is the theater of sovereignty's relativity. Except in some cases, such as Africa, (see Tandeka Nkiwane's contribution; see also Sindjoun, 1999) , this situation was ignored or concealed.
The process and context of globalization reconfigure the concept of sovereignty. The epistemological obstacle is the attachment to Westphalia as a founding myth of international relations. When one takes into account sovereignty as it is (empirical sovereignty) and not sovereignty as prescribed by the Treaty of Westphalia (normative sovereignty), current changes are perceived as normal: sovereignty is not an essence; neither a definitive substance. Those who either commend or deplore its reconfiguration take an essentialist approach, as to an historical phenomenon. Globalization reminds us that sovereignty is relative and dynamic. Meanwhile, it is excessive to proclaim the end of sovereignty; sovereignty still makes sense in international relations through new meanings and specific uses.
The concept of the state is linked to that of sovereignty; the realist doctrine considers the state as an actor par excellence in international relations: it is the referential unit. The "statophile" dimension of realism is well known (see the contribution of Tandeka Nkiwane in this issue; see also Youngs, 1999: 17-33) . The "statophobic" aspect of the most important literature on globalization is becoming clear; this "statophobic" or "statocide" approach is expressed as follows by Arjun Appadurai ". . . I have come to be convinced that the nation-state, as a complex modern political form, is on its last legs" (Appadurai, 1997: 19) .
The state is challenged as the referential unit of analysis; the notion of "humanity" as put forward by some human rights international standards, or by some cosmopolitan harm conventions (see the contribution of Andrew Linklater) by "global public goods" (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 1999) , has gained importance; it is becoming a point of identification from which the state is questioned and contradicted. This situation is dramatized in African countries where the state's existence is problematic, where the notion of humanity leads to pressures for democratization or respect for human rights, because of the importance of the "international community" in economic, social, and political life. International institutionalization restructures the state; in fact, "constructing the world polity" (Ruggie, 1998) necessarily affects the understanding and the functioning of the state. Moreover, the state is no longer the only "unit of survival." In a context in which global awareness is legitimated, the state, restricted to its narrow national perspective, is in turmoil (Evans, 1997) . Meanwhile, a unidimensional approach is to be abandoned in favor of an analytical perspective that combines the notions of "national" and "global" in a relational continuum. "Humanity," "world polity," and "states" are in interaction (Sassen, 1996) . They are distinct and complementary levels of analysis.
The process of globalization is associated with the imagery of the decline of the state (Strange, 1996) . According to Arjun Appadurai (1993) , the crisis of the state is linked to deterritorialization; it is made possible by five dimensions of global cultural flows: ethnoscapes ("landscapes of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers, and other moving persons and groups…"); technoscapes (global configuration of technology characterized by "increasingly complex relationship between money flows, political possibilities and the availability of both unskilled and highly skilled labor"); finance-scapes (mysterious disposition of global capital); mediascape and ideoscape (a landscape of images reinforced by the electronic capabilities and the communication revolution) (Appadurai, 1993: 276-278) .
Deterritorialization is a proposition that supports the idea of "state crisis"; it is often used with the argument for "denationalisation," the call for "social science after patriotism" (Appadurai, 1997: 18-23) ; (see also Reich, 1993) . Such an approach is narrowly unidimensional: it neglects that territory and nation still make sense for populations (Sassen, 1996) . Their subjective dimension is underestimated and over-simplified by Appadurai. In fact, globalization in relation with the reconceptualization of the state constitutes a heuristic opportunity. It is known that international relations in its realist tendency lacks a strong sociological theory of the state (Hobden, 1998) ; the state has generally been taken for granted, considered identical everywhere, as if social, cultural, and political circumstances had no impact. Such nominalism is an epistemological obstacle (Weber, 1992) . The idea of the state has different meanings and is a dynamic institution. In this regard, globalization helps us to desacralize the state through its reconfiguration. The "state" has never had the same meaning, nor one meaning through time and space. The epistemological challenge is the elaboration in international relations of an approach to the state that takes both process and relations into account (see the contribution of Tandeka Nkiwane). It is also important to envisage the possibility of the state as a cultural or symbolic form that will survive the decline of its capacities (Sindjoun, 1999) . Another method of analysis is to re-examine the Weberian legacy of the state as a monopoly; the reality, as reinforced by the context of globalization, reveals the state as an oligopoly exercising hegemony over violence, personal allegiances, and so on. The analytical challenge may be to integrate the tension between "monopoly" and "oligopoly."
The reconfiguration of the founding concepts of international relations, illustrating the dynamics of the discipline and the reformulation of the scope of analysis, is linked to important paradigmatic changes. To contest the epistemic monopoly of realism gives more opportunities for the expression of different paradigmatic approaches (Smith, 1996: 11-44; Waever, 1996: 149-185) . Even if we must continue to take the relevance of realism seriously (Jervis, 1998; Sindjoun and Vennesson, 2000) , its relativity is increasingly demonstrable (see the contribution of Bertrand Badie). The lesson must be to renounce the complex of "only one paradigm"; the evolution toward "paradigmatic complementarity in the 224 International Political Science Review 22(3) study of International Relations" (Link, 1989: 99-116) , seems to be a solution.
Paradigmatic complementarity has to do also with the reinforcement of interdisciplinarity: philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and so on, are more and more involved in the study of international relations (see the contributions of Bertrand Badie and Andrew Linklater). It is a dynamic discipline; its changes are linked to time and space. The Western or American ambiance is important in this regard (Hoffmann, 1995: 212-241; Bull, 1995: 208) . As revitalized by Samuel Huntington's, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) , the encounter between International Relations and Cultural Studies will increase reflections on the concepts used, on the social and historical origins of international relations theories. Postcolonial theory in international relations, for example, debates the neglect or the underestimation of Third World experience (see the contribution of Tandeka Nkiwane; see also Sindjoun, 1999) , and the Westernization and Americanization of international relations (see Jorgensen, 2000 ; see also Steel, 1993: 105) . It is clear that some national or cultural stereotypes affect international relations. The revelation of the social and historical origins of theories and concepts, important as it is, must not be a hindrance to operationalization or instrumentalization of those theories and concepts in Third World societies (see Neuman, 1998) ; otherwise, one falls into the trap of essentialization: theories and concepts are not necessarily imprisoned by their social origins.
International Relations, a Discipline Analyzing Change
At the same time that changes affect the field of international relations, its own analysis changes, as indicated by the articles which follow; the analysis of those changes is articulated around the restructuring of relations between nations (see also Ruggie, 1989: 21) . In various analyses of a changing world, the changing discipline of international relations envisages the transformation of the structure of international relations; as understood here, it does not concern the hierarchy or the distribution of power (without prejudice to its importance); it has more to do with the enlargement of the "nature" of actors involved in international relations. It is not new, but it is more intensified than in the past (see the contribution of Stephen Krasner). Historically, the state has never been the exclusive actor in international relations: its exclusivity was a theoretical elaboration based on the Westphalian interpretation of international relations. The problem is more with the mode of analysis than with the reality.
Reflecting on the restructuring of international relations, James Rosenau (1990) depicts two contradictory worlds: "the state-centered world" (states as actors) against the "multi-centered world" (made up of non-state actors). Here it appears that globalization intensifies the privatization of the quality of the actor in international relations; it gives more opportunities to non-state actors such as individuals, firms, and transnational non-governmental organizations. This "turbulent model" is interesting in its analysis of "challenges to conventional conceptions that delineate territoriality, community, productivity, commitment, work, religion, loyalty and a host of other factors that have long been taken for granted" (Rosenau, 1997: 17) ; but its dichotomy, "state-centered world" versus "multi-centered world" is too absolute. The "triangular game" elaborated by Bertrand Badie in this issue (state ↔ transnational actors ↔ "identitary" actors) seems to me more in accord with the complex reality. From the idea of the new In fact, what is epistemologically secure is the renunciation of absolutist logic; the enlargement of the quality of actors in international relations does not mean the rejection of the state. The complex of relations and networks induced by globalization is clearly established by the interdependence between non-state and state actors. As envisaged here, the notion of interdependence includes both conflict and cooperation; it refers to a dynamic configuration. The image of "a new medievalism" (Bull, 1995: 248) expresses the plurality of actors and challenges to state actors, but its teleological and finalist orientation can be a problem.
Historically, the Middle Ages were characterized by the crisis of authority of seigniory which ended when it was replaced by the state as a political institution (Elias, 1975) ; the finalist idea of the expression "new Middle Age" implies the end of the state. As any political institution, the state is not eternal; to begin an analysis of the reconfiguration of international relations with the preconceived idea of the pathological crisis of the state, does not help to understand its dynamic transformation in the context of globalization (Clark, 1999: 52-145; Youngs, 1999: 135-137) .
In sum, the field of international relations in a time of globalization should be regarded more as a dynamic discipline than a discipline in crisis; transformations are normal, not pathological. International Political Science Review 22(3) 
